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ABSTRACT
Several policy makers and economists have proposed the adoption of a carbon tax in the United States.
It is widely recognized that such a tax in practice must take the form of a tax on the consumption of
energy products such as gasoline. Although a large existing literature examines the sensitivity of gasoline
consumption to changes in price, these estimates may not be appropriate for evaluating the effectiveness
of such a tax. First, most of these studies fail to address the endogeneity of gasoline prices. Second,
the responsiveness of gasoline consumption to a change in tax may differ from the responsiveness
of consumption to an average change in price. We address these challenges using a variety of methods
including traditional single-equation regression models, estimated by least squares or instrumental
variables methods, and structural vector autoregressions. We compare the results from these approaches,
highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each. Our preferred approach exploits the historical
variation in U.S. federal and state gasoline taxes. Our most credible estimates imply that a 10 cent
per gallon increase in the gasoline tax would reduce carbon emissions from vehicles in the United
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Several policymakers and economists have proposed the adoption of a carbon tax in the United
States.1 In the United States 33.8% of carbon dioxide emissions are derived from the transportation
sector, so the responsiveness of gasoline consumption to tax changes will play a signiﬁcant role in
determining the evolution of overall carbon dioxide emissions in response to policy interventions.2
It is widely recognized that a carbon tax in practice must take the form of a tax on the consumption
of energy products such as gasoline (e.g. Fullerton and West, 2002). A tax of $10.00 per ton of
carbon dioxide, as suggested by Nordhaus (2007), for example, would increase gasoline taxes by
approximately 9 cents.3 In this paper, we evaluate how eﬀective a gasoline tax increase would be
in reducing gasoline consumption.
Our most credible estimates imply that a 10 cent tax increase would decrease U.S. carbon
emissions from the transportation sector by about 1.5% and decrease total U.S. carbon emissions
by about 0.5%. To put this estimate in context, total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions increased by
1.1% annually between 1990 and 2007, so a 10 cent gasoline tax increase would approximately oﬀset
half a year of growth in total U.S. emissions.4 This estimate captures only the short-run response
resulting from reduced discretionary driving and reduced driving speed, for example. The long-run
response is likely to be considerably larger as drivers substitute toward more fuel-eﬃcient vehicles.
Despite the policy relevance of the question to be addressed in this paper, empirical evidence
on the eﬀectiveness of gasoline taxes on carbon emissions is virtually nonexistent. A large related
literature has examined the sensitivity of gasoline consumption to changes in prices. Reviews
by Dahl and Sterner (1991) and Greene, Kahn and Gibson (1999) identify dozens of relevant
econometric studies containing estimates of price elasticities. These estimates, however, are not
appropriate for evaluating the eﬀectiveness of gasoline taxes. First, most of these studies do not
address the endogeneity of the price of gasoline. It is well known that increases in the demand
1For example, in September 2007 Representative John Dingell, then chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, proposed a $50 tax per ton of carbon ($13.64 per ton of carbon dioxide). See H. Josef Hebert “Plan Uses
Taxes to Fight Climate Change,” Associated Press (October 2, 2007) for details.
2United States Department of Energy, “Energy Outlook 2008”, DOE/EIA-0383(2008), Table A18, Carbon Dioxide
Emissions by Sector and Source, 2006 and 2030.
3A carbon tax of $35 per ton from Nordhaus (2007) implies a tax of approximately $10 per ton of carbon dioxide
because the atomic weight of carbon is 12 atomic mass units, while the weight of carbon dioxide is 44, so one ton
of carbon equals 44/12 tons of carbon dioxide. To avoid confusion we use carbon dioxide throughout. The carbon
dioxide content of gasoline is approximately 0.0088 metric tons per gallon, so a $10.00 tax per ton implies 8.8 cents
per gallon.
4U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report 2007,
DOE/EIA-0573, Table 5, “U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Energy and Industry, 1990, 1995, and 2000-2007”.
1for gasoline cause the price of gasoline to increase, resulting in a spurious correlation between the
price and the regression error, and biasing estimates of the price elasticity toward zero. Second,
the response of gasoline consumption to a change in tax is likely to diﬀer from its response to an
average change in price.
In this paper we address these challenges using a variety of methods including traditional single-
equation regression models, estimated by least squares or instrumental variables methods, and
structural vector autoregressions. We compare the results from these approaches, highlighting the
advantages and disadvantages of each. Our preferred approach exploits the historical variation in
U.S. federal and state gasoline taxes. Where possible, lessons learned from applying one model are
used in specifying another. Although all models have their limitations, the overall exercise serves to
document what can and what cannot be learned from the available data. Such a discussion seems
warranted before adopting any policy proposal regarding gasoline taxes.
We begin by modeling gasoline consumption at the national level using monthly data from 1989
to 2008.5 The use of monthly data facilitates the identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀects of a gasoline tax
increase. To allow a direct comparison with the previous literature, we ﬁrst focus on the construction
of price elasticities. Using a single-equation speciﬁcation in log diﬀerences we ﬁnd a price elasticity
of -0.10, similar to results from a recent study by Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2008). Although
we are sympathetic to the idea that the price elasticity is low, standard concerns about price
endogeneity with respect to quantity suggest that this estimate may be biased toward zero. Next
we model gasoline consumption at the state level using panel data methods. The advantage of the
panel speciﬁcation is that we can include time ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved time-varying
consumption factors that may have obscured the true elasticity in the national data. With this
speciﬁcation we ﬁnd a price elasticity of -0.19 – still small, but signiﬁcantly larger than the estimate
based on the national data.
Even this panel approach, however, does not fully address the issue of price endogeneity. An
alternative approach to this endogeneity problem has been the use of instruments for gasoline
prices. While this approach is appealing, the challenge has been to ﬁnd instruments that are both
truly exogenous and strong in the econometric sense (see Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002).6 In this
5A complete series of monthly data by state for gasoline consumption is not available prior to 1989.
6For example, Ramsey, Rasche and Allen (1975) and Dahl (1979) use the relative prices of reﬁnery products such as
kerosene and residual fuel oil as instruments. As noted in Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008) the problem with this
approach is that the relative prices of other reﬁnery outputs are likely to be correlated with gasoline demand shocks.
Instead, Hughes, Knittel and Sperling instrument using changes in global crude oil production such as a strike by oil
workers in Venezuela in 2002. Although these instruments are arguably exogenous, Kilian (2008a) provides evidence
that crude oil supply shocks are driven by exogenous political events are weak instruments, rendering estimation and
2paper we use changes in gasoline taxes by state and month as an instrument. Even though tax
legislation may respond to current prices, the implementation of tax changes typically occurs with
a lag making it reasonable to believe that changes in tax rates are uncorrelated with unobserved
changes in demand. In constructing our instrument we are careful to exclude ad valorem gasoline
taxes (used in many states) because they are functionally related to price, violating the endogeneity
assumption.
For the national data our instrumental variable (IV) estimates rely on the historical variation
in gasoline taxes over time. We ﬁnd a price elasticity that is much larger, but not statistically
distinguishable from zero, even after accounting for weak instruments. An alternative IV approach
is to exploit additional variation in gasoline taxes across states. The resulting panel IV estimates are
substantially larger than the OLS panel estimates. In our preferred estimates that restrict attention
to dates of nominal state tax increases, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant price elasticity of −0.46.
We examine a variety of alternative IV speciﬁcations including speciﬁcations that control for factors
potentially correlated with gasoline tax changes and we consider alternative estimators. The results
are remarkably similar across speciﬁcations. In addition, we contrast the IV estimates to alternative
elasticity estimates obtained from recursively identiﬁed vector autoregressions in which the percent
change in gasoline prices (or alternatively the percent change in gasoline taxes) is ordered ﬁrst and
the percent change in gasoline consumption is ordered second. With this approach the elasticity is
identiﬁed under the assumption that changes in gasoline prices (or taxes) are predetermined with
respect to all factors driving U.S. gasoline consumption.7
Overall, our results indicate that gasoline consumption is more sensitive to gasoline taxes than
would be implied by recent estimates of the gasoline price elasticity. A likely reason is that price
changes induced by tax changes are more persistent than other price changes and thus induce
larger behavioral changes. In addition, gasoline tax increases are often accompanied by extensive
media coverage. Even under the largest plausible estimates, however, gasoline tax increases of the
magnitude that have been discussed would have only a moderate short-run impact on total U.S.
gasoline consumption and carbon emissions based on our estimates. A natural conjecture is that
the long-run elasticities will be larger, but standard econometric models based on historical data
inference by standard methods invalid.
7The assumption of predetermined prices rules out instantaneous feedback from quantities to prices. In other
words, gasoline prices respond to changes in demand only with a delay. This identifying assumption permits the
consistent estimation of the expected response of consumption to innovation in prices. In conjunction with the
assumption that there are no other exogenous events that are correlated with the exogenous gasoline price innovation,
these responses can be interpreted as the causal eﬀect of the price innovation. Similar impulse response models have
been estimated by a variety of authors in related contexts (see, e.g., Edelstein and Kilian 2007, Hamilton 2009).
3do not allow us to predict such long-run eﬀects.
The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data used for the analysis and
describes the evolution of gasoline taxes in the United States over the period 1989-2008. Section 3
presents least squares and IV estimates from log diﬀerenced single-equation speciﬁcations. Section 4
presents results from structural VAR models. Section 5 assesses the eﬀects of the proposed gasoline
tax on carbon emissions, and section 6 summarizes the policy implications.
2 Data
Figure 1 describes national gasoline prices, consumption, and taxes over the period 1989-2008
from the U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Transportation. The data are monthly.
Our sample period covers January 1989 through March 2008. We focus on this period because a
continuous time series of gasoline consumption by state is not available prior to 1989. Moreover,
recent evidence from Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2008) indicates that gasoline price elasticities
have declined since the mid 1980s, making the 1990s and 2000s the most relevant period for under-
standing current demand behavior. Both the price and quantity time series exhibit a clear seasonal
pattern. Real prices ﬂuctuate between $1.50 and $2.00 between 1989 and 2004 before increasing
to $3.00 and above in 2005.8 Gasoline consumption increases steadily during the 1990s and then
appears to level oﬀ after 2005.9 Tax per gallon increases with federal tax increases at the end of
1990 and in 1993, and then steadily erodes in real terms.
Prices from the U.S. Department of Energy exclude federal, state, and local taxes. Accordingly,
for this study we constructed a comprehensive panel of state-level gasoline tax rates, and calculated
after-tax prices.10 In constructing taxes we were careful to distinguish between “per unit” and ad
valorem taxes. The most common method for taxing gasoline is to establish a ”per unit” tax per
8Gasoline prices are from U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum Marketing
Monthly Report – Gasoline Prices by Formulation, Grade, Sales Type”. Prices are collected by the E.I.A. using the
EIA-782B, a monthly survey of approximately 2,200 gasoline resellers and retailers and reﬂect average prices for sales
to end users of all grades of motor gasoline. Here and throughout where appropriate we calculate national average
prices weighting by volume.
9Sales volumes come from U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum Marketing
Monthly Report - Prime Supplier Sales Volumes by Product and Area”. Sales volumes are collected by the E.I.A.
using the EIA-782C, a monthly survey of all prime suppliers, a small group of currently 185 ﬁrms nationwide that
produce, import, or transport petroleum products across state boundaries and local marketing areas. The EIA-
782C measures sales volumes within each state. Accordingly, respondents are asked to report gasoline sales to local
distributors, local retailers, and local end users, excluding sales to other prime suppliers and to other companies that
transport gasoline across state lines.
10U.S. Department of Transportation, “Highway Statistics”, 1990-2008 publishes state tax rates for gasoline by
year as well as the exact dates of all changes.
4gallon. This is the method used for the federal gasoline tax and most states. However, a handful
of states use ad valorem taxes in addition to “per unit” taxes. Gasoline sales in California, for
example, are subject to the state’s 6% sales tax. As gasoline prices have increased, these states
have seen large increases in tax receipts. We include ad valorem taxes in our measure of after-
tax prices. However, it is important to exclude this variation in taxes when we use tax as an
instrumental variable because these changes fail the exogeneity test; indeed the gasoline tax in
these states is functionally related to price. Finally, as an overall test of the validity of our measure
of the after-tax price of gasoline, we compare our measure (weighted by volume) to the city average
price of gasoline from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Figure 2. It is reassuring that the two series
are very similar.
The advantage of this data source is that it provides data for all states and years. An alternative
to using state-level aggregate prices and consumption would be to use available household surveys
such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) or the Residential Transportation and Energy
Consumption Surveys (RTECS). For example, Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) use the RTECS to
describe non-parametrically the relationship between gasoline consumption and household income.
Whereas the RTECS is valuable for cross-sectional studies such as Schmalensee and Stoker (1999),
it is not appropriate in our context because the survey is carried out only once every 3 years.
Furthermore, whereas the RTECS measure of gasoline consumption is based on odometer readings,
the CEX measure is calculated using self-reported expenditure on gasoline and thus is likely subject
to more reporting error than the Department of Energy data.
Figures 3 and 4 describe the variation in tax rates across states and over time. States vary
both in the size and frequency of tax rate changes. In real terms there is more variation during
the ﬁrst half of the period because the overall level of taxes is higher. Finally, Figure 5 shows the
timing of tax increases and decreases that exceed 2 cents per gallon. The number of tax increases
far exceeds the number of tax decreases. Since 2005 there have been no changes to the gasoline tax
in any state.
3 Single-Equation Models of Gasoline Consumption
3.1 Least Squares Estimates
A key feature of our analysis is the use of monthly rather than yearly observations. Most
importantly, this allows us, in later speciﬁcations, to describe the entire temporal path of the
5response of gasoline consumption to changes in gasoline prices. The monthly measures also reveal
variation in price and consumption that may be obscured in annual data.
We begin by modeling gasoline consumption at the national level. As a starting point, consider
the following commonly used speciﬁcation (see, e.g., Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling 2008). National
gasoline consumption in month t in logs yt is postulated to depend linearly on the volume-weighted
average inﬂation-adjusted after-tax price of gasoline (in logs) pt, month-of-the-year dummies λt,
and unobserved idiosyncratic time-varying factors ǫt,
yt = α0 + α1pt + λt + ǫt.
Whereas most previous studies have estimated gasoline consumption equations in log levels,
we estimate the national aggregate model using log diﬀerences, since both yt and pt are highly
persistent and trending:
∆yt = α0 + α1∆pt + λt + ǫt. (1)
Thus the response of gasoline consumption is identiﬁed using price changes rather than price levels.
In addition to this national speciﬁcation, we estimate a state panel using our balanced panel of
ﬁfty states and the District of Columbia,
∆yit = β0 + β1∆pit + ρt + ωit. (2)
where gasoline consumption in logs yit for state i and month t depends linearly on the after-tax price
of gasoline in logs pit, time ﬁxed eﬀects ρt, and unobserved idiosyncratic state-speciﬁc time-varying
factors ωit.11
The coeﬃcients of interest are α1 in the national speciﬁcation and β1 in the state panel. With
the log-log speciﬁcation these coeﬃcients describe the 1-month price elasticity. From a behavioral
standpoint there is no particular interest in the one-month elasticity. Rather we would like to
know how households respond over a longer period of time such as one year. It can be shown that
including additional lags in models (1) and (2) does little to change the estimates of α1 and β1.
This suggests that the estimates of these parameters may eﬀectively be interpreted as one-year
elasticities as well.
11It is important to emphasize that the log diﬀerences speciﬁcation controls implicitly for time invariant factors,
rendering state ﬁxed eﬀects unnecessary. One disadvantage of this speciﬁcation is that it makes it diﬃcult to estimate
the income elasticity, because income changes very slowly over time. Since the focus of our paper is the price elasticity,
this is of little practical concern.
6Table 1 presents parameter estimates and standard errors from the national aggregate and
state panel speciﬁcations. In the national speciﬁcation, the price elasticity is -0.10 and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As a point of comparison, Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2008) using a
level speciﬁcation and similar data for 2001-2006 ﬁnd a price elasticity of -0.04 which is not much
diﬀerent from our estimate after accounting for sampling uncertainty. In contrast, in the state
panel speciﬁcation, the price elasticity is almost twice as large. The estimate of -0.19 is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In order to understand the diﬀerence between these two estimates it
is helpful to recall the key identifying assumptions in each model. The estimate in the national
speciﬁcation is consistent if price changes are uncorrelated with ǫt:
E(∆ptǫt) = 0 ∀ t.
This orthogonality condition is unlikely to hold because of standard price endogeneity considera-
tions. Increases in gasoline consumption cause prices to increase, leading to a spurious correlation
between ∆pt and ǫt. This correlation will, in general, cause estimates of the price elasticity to be
biased toward zero as all of the predicted change in consumption is attributed to the change in
price.
While this concern is of ﬁrst-order importance in model (1), the state panel is less likely to
suﬀer from standard price endogeneity concerns because of the time ﬁxed eﬀects that control for
unobserved changes in demand over time. This helps explain the increase in the price elasticity
estimate in Table 1. Even the panel approach, however, is an imperfect solution because state-level
prices may still reﬂect state-speciﬁc diﬀerential changes in demand. In the following subsection we
address the problem of price endogeneity more directly using an instrumental variable estimation
strategy. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in identifying movements in gasoline prices driven by tax
changes.
3.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates
3.2.1 Baseline Estimates
In both the national speciﬁcation and in the state panel we instrument for price using inﬂation-
adjusted changes in the log of the tax per gallon, ∆taxt and ∆taxit, i = 1...51. As described earlier,
we are careful to exclude ad valorem taxes in our measure of tax because this component of taxes
is functionally related to price. For example, gasoline sales in New York state in January 1995 were
7subject to an 18.4 cent federal tax and a 22.6 cent state tax. Our measure of the tax is therefore 41
cents, which we express in 2008 dollars. Gasoline sales in New York are also subject to the state’s
sales tax, but we exclude this ad valorem component in calculating our measure of the unit gasoline
tax.
Table 2 reports results the IV estimates of models (1) and (2). In the national speciﬁcation,
the IV estimate of the eﬀect of price on gasoline consumption is -2.38. This point estimate is
dramatically larger than the OLS estimate of -0.10 reported in Table 1, though not statistically
signiﬁcant. The credibility of this estimate hinges on the instrument being valid and strong. Since
the instrument F-statistic is near zero, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero coeﬃcient on
∆taxt in the ﬁrst-stage equation, indicating a possible weak-instrument problem. It is perhaps not
surprising that gasoline taxes are not a particularly strong instrument at the national level. Our
measure of taxes in the national speciﬁcation is an average of tax rates across states, weighted by
the volume of gasoline consumption in each state, and thus includes both federal and state taxes.
Although federal taxes clearly inﬂuence the national price, tax changes in individual states are
typically too small to provide meaningful variation at the national level. The lack of correlation
between tax changes and price changes at the national level causes the standard error on ∆pt to be
large in magnitude and raises concerns about asymptotic bias in the estimate of α1. Accordingly,
we have also examined the conﬁdence region for the coeﬃcient on ∆pt based on the conditional
likelihood ratio approach developed by Moreira (2003). The conﬁdence set includes essentially all
real numbers. We are left with the conclusion that IV estimates provide little information about
the parameter of interest in the national data.
In addition to these weak-instrument concerns, there are concerns about the exogeneity of the
instrument. For the IV estimator to be consistent, changes in taxes must be uncorrelated with the
error term. This assumption cannot be tested, and we must make the case that cov(∆taxtǫt) = 0
based on economic arguments. At both the federal and the state level, gasoline tax legislation is
made by democratically-elected legislators, and it stands to reason that policy decisions also reﬂect
current economic conditions. If, for example, gasoline tax increases tend to be implemented during
times when gasoline demand is decreasing, this would introduce negative correlation between ∆taxt
and ǫt, biasing the IV estimate away from zero. These concerns would be particularly important
if gasoline tax increases could be implemented quickly. In practice, however, even though tax
legislation may respond to current conditions, the implementation of tax changes typically occurs
with a considerable lag. This delay strengthens the case for the validity of tax changes as an
8instrument.
Although there is little information in national IV estimates, a more promising IV strategy may
be based on the additional variation in gasoline tax changes at the state level. In the state panel
speciﬁcation, the IV estimate is -1.14 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. While smaller
than the IV estimate from the national speciﬁcation, this point estimate is still much larger than
the panel OLS estimate of -0.19 reported in Table 1. The standard error of the elasticity estimate
is large. After accounting for sampling variation one cannot rule out at the 95% conﬁdence level
the possibility that the true elasticity is only -0.58, for example.
Again it is important to evaluate the strength of the instrument. Unlike in the national spec-
iﬁcation, the instrument F-statistic in the state panel is large with a p-value near zero. Thus one
normally would not suspect a weak-instrument problem. Nonetheless, we have also examined the
conﬁdence region for the coeﬃcient on ∆pit based on the conditional likelihood ratio approach
developed by Moreira (2003). The implied 95% conﬁdence interval of [−1.45,−0.86] is somewhat
narrower then the panel estimate in Table 2, but in the same ballpark. It has to be noted, however,
that Moreira’s approach does not allow for clustering at the state level in accounting for serial
correlation, unlike the standard error reported in Table 2. Overall, the state panel does not appear
to suﬀer from a weak-instrument problem. This highlights the usefulness of exploiting across-state
variation in gasoline taxes in constructing the instrument.
The state panel IV estimate is considerably smaller than the national IV estimate, but still much
larger than most previous estimates of the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand reported
in the literature. To understand better the mechanics underlying this result, in Table 3 we report
additional least squares estimates for both the national aggregate and state panel speciﬁcations.
First, changes in gasoline prices are regressed on changes in gasoline taxes. Second, changes in
gasoline consumption are regressed on changes in gasoline taxes. Because the IV estimator is
exactly identiﬁed, the IV estimates reported in Table 2 are a simple ratio of the estimates presented
in Table 3. In the state panel the elasticity of gasoline prices with respect to gasoline taxes is 0.28.
Evaluated at the average value of the after-tax gasoline price of $1.81 and the average value of
the gasoline tax of $0.45 per gallon, this implies a near one-for-one relationship between taxes and
prices, consistent with evidence from previous studies that have examined the incidence of gasoline
taxes.12 In the state panel the elasticity of gasoline consumption with respect to gasoline taxes
12Using evidence from gasoline sales tax moratorium in Illinois and Indiana, Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) ﬁnd
that 70% or more of state tax is borne by buyers. Studies that have used aggregate state-level data have also found
near full shifting of state gasoline taxes. See, e.g. Chouinard and Perloﬀ (2004) and Alm, Sennoga and Skidmore
9is -0.32. Taken literally, this estimate implies that a doubling of the gasoline tax from $0.45 per
gallon to $0.90 per gallon would reduce gasoline consumption by 32%.13 In an eﬀort to assess the
robustness of that result, below we explore a number of alternative speciﬁcations.
The identiﬁcation in the IV model comes from changes in taxes over time. If consumers are
responding to announcements of nominal tax changes rather than actual changes in real taxes, the
IV estimate may be biased. This distinction seems plausible, as gradual real changes are diﬃcult
to detect for consumers. This reasoning suggests that we restrict attention to months in which
discrete changes in nominal gasoline taxes occurred at the state level. Table 4 reports IV estimates
of the price elasticity of gasoline consumption from six additional speciﬁcations. Although the
ﬁrst-stage F-statistic declines with the sample size, none of the six speciﬁcations appears to suﬀer
from a weak-instrument problem.
In column (1), the sample is restricted to include states and months in which increases or
decreases in nominal state gasoline taxes occurred. Note that out of 11,730 total state by month
observations, only 268 were strict changes. In that speciﬁcation ˆ β1 drops to -0.74. It may seem
that larger tax changes would induce disproportionately larger responses, but further restricting
the sample in columns (2) and (3) to include only nominal changes of at least 1 and 2 cents has
little impact on the estimate. One might also expect that increases and decreases would have
diﬀerent impacts. Since the closest analogy to the gasoline tax increases recently contemplated
by policymakers would be a nominal tax increase, column (4) restricts the sample to include only
nominal increases. This reduces the sample size to 210 and causes the elasticity to fall to -0.46. That
coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We view this estimate as the most credible
estimate of the likely eﬀect of proposed gasoline tax increases. Finally, we investigate whether the
elasticity increases disproportionately in the magnitude of the tax increase. In columns (5) and (6)
the sample is restricted further to include only increases of at least one cent and at least two cents,
respectively. As we restrict the sample to large increases, the point estimates of the price elasticity
actually decline, while the standard errors increase. There is no evidence of nonlinear adjustment.
(2009). Our elasticity implies that (.28) ∗
1.81
.45 ∗ 100 = 113% of the tax is shifted to prices with a standard error of
7%.
13Between January 2004 and March 2008 average after-tax gasoline prices increased from $1.73 to $3.21 (see Figure
1). This is a 62% price increase. Abstracting from sampling uncertainty, a mechanical interpretation of the estimated
price elasticities in Table 1 might suggest that this price increase would be associated with between a 6% and 12% drop
in gasoline consumption. It would be misleading, however, to draw the conclusion that based on the IV estimate of
the same elasticities in Table 2, this price increase should have been associated with a (−1.14)(62%) = 71% predicted
drop in gasoline consumption. The reason is that the IV estimate identiﬁes only those movements in gasoline prices
that are driven by tax increases whereas the observed increase in price was not associated with any increase in taxes.
103.2.2 Alternative Speciﬁcations
While the preferred parameter estimate in Table 4 is considerably smaller than the state panel IV
parameter estimate reported in Table 2, the fact that the elasticity estimate is still large relative to
the panel OLS estimate in Table 1 calls for additional robustness checks. Table 5 presents estimates
from a number of alternative IV speciﬁcations based on the nominal tax increase speciﬁcation in
column (4) of Table 4. One possible concern is the presence of outliers. Column (2) in Table 5
shows that allowing for outliers does not alter the basic results. The median IV estimator ˆ β1 is
almost identical to the baseline IV estimate.
Another possible concern is the possible endogeneity of changes in state gasoline taxes with
respect to omitted variables. This concern did not arise in the national speciﬁcation and may
account for the diﬀerence between the panel IV estimates and the panel OLS estimate. It is in-
structive to review the typical rationales for state gasoline tax increases provided by policymakers.
There are two main justiﬁcations that are used time and again. First, gasoline tax increases are
often implemented in order to ﬁnance investments in states’ transportation infrastructure such as
highways and bridges. Such tax increases are plausibly exogenous. Second, gasoline tax increases
are often implemented in response to state budget deﬁcits which are likely to be correlated with
macroeconomic conditions at the state level such as a state’s unemployment rate.14 If state legis-
lators are responding to unobserved changes in factors that are correlated with state-level demand
for gasoline, this will violate the key identifying assumption for IV. In order to assess the validity of
this concern, Table 5 presents results from three additional IV speciﬁcations. The speciﬁcation in
column (3) controls for changes in state-level unemployment rates.15 Another possible confounding
factor is heterogeneity in population growth across states. The speciﬁcation in column (4) controls
for the percent change in the state population density.16 As a ﬁnal check, the speciﬁcation in
column (5) allows for both changes in the unemployment rate and in the population density. In all
cases the results are similar to the baseline IV estimate. The additional controls in columns (3),(4)
14Speciﬁcally, high levels of employment and economic activity are associated with high levels of state revenue and
low welfare expenditures. High levels of employment and economic activity also may be associated with high gasoline
consumption. Thus, failing to control for employment may bias estimates of the price elasticity away from zero.
15We also estimated a speciﬁcation that includes both changes in state-level unemployment rates and lagged changes
in state-level unemployment rates. The results were similar.
16Population density was constructed by the authors using population statistics from U.S. Census Bureau, Popula-
tion Division, “Table 2 of Current Population Reports Series, Intercensal Estimates of the Total Resident Population
of States: 1980 to 1990 (P25-1106)”; “Time Series of Intercensal State Population Estimates: 1990 to 2000 (CO-
EST2001-12-00)”; and “Table 1: Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States,
and Puerto Rico: 2000 to 2008 (NST-EST2008-01)”. Population was then divided by the total land area for each
state from “Census 2000 Summary File 1”. Population statistics are available in July of each year 1988-2008. We
created monthly estimates of population density using linear interpolation by state.”
11and (5) have virtually no eﬀect on ˆ β1.
Table 5 demonstrates that omission of macroeconomic conditions at the state-level does not
provide an explanation for the relatively high IV estimates. Yet another potential concern is that
the timing of gasoline tax changes at the state level may depend on the overall level of gasoline
prices. One reason is that at times state policymakers have chosen to cut gasoline taxes in an eﬀort
to assist consumers, when gasoline prices are unusually high. This was the case, for example, when
Connecticut temporarily decreased their gasoline tax by 7 cents between July 2000 and January
2001 in response to anticipated higher than usual summer gasoline prices.17 Another reason is that
policymakers may be reluctant to call for gasoline tax increases when prices are unusually high,
but are likely to resume their eﬀorts when gasoline prices have fallen. An obvious concern is that
such behavior would induce a negative correlation between changes in gasoline taxes and changes
in gasoline prices, causing a downward bias in the estimate of the eﬀect of gasoline tax changes on
gasoline price changes. It is unclear how pervasive this phenomenon is in the data, but the fact
that the estimates in Table 3 imply a nearly proportionate relationship between tax changes and
price changes suggests that the resulting bias must be negligible in practice.
It would be tempting to relate these estimates to well-known estimates of the price elasticity of
gasoline consumption. Relative to that benchmark, these estimates may seem surprisingly large.
This analogy is ﬂawed, however, because IV methods are designed for the estimation of structural
models. If we interpret regression model (2) as a structural model of the eﬀect of gasoline tax
changes on gasoline consumption, then β1 captures changes in gasoline consumption caused by
changes in gasoline prices that are induced by changes in gasoline taxes. In contrast, the same
parameter in a reduced-form model to be estimated by OLS corresponds to the expected change
in gasoline consumption given a change in gasoline prices whether induced by taxes or not. This
distinction matters because gasoline price changes caused by tax changes are much more persistent
than gasoline price changes caused by most other factors and may, for example, lead households to
replace a fuel ineﬃcient car when they would not have made that choice in response to a typical
price change. In addition, gasoline tax changes are typically accompanied by extensive media
coverage which may amplify the impact on gasoline consumption. For these reasons, it does not
make sense to interpret our IV estimates as price elasticities and the comparison with conventional
price elasticity estimates is misleading. In fact there is every reason to believe that the IV estimates
17See, e.g. Daniela Altimari and Matthew Daly “Rowland Warns of ‘Gridlock’ Without Gas Tax Cut,” Hartford
Courant (April 1, 2000) and Christopher Keating “The Tax Cuts are Served $12.3 Billion Budget Deal Reduces Gas
Levy, Aids Hospitals,” Hartford Courant (April 28, 2000).
12should be higher than conventional OLS estimates.
3.2.3 Policy Implications
When comparing the results from the OLS and IV approaches it is important to consider
what the diﬀerent estimates imply for the eﬀect of a given change in gasoline taxes on gasoline
consumption. The percent reduction in gasoline consumption resulting from a tax increase of τ







where ˆ η1 corresponds to the estimates ˆ α1,LS, ˆ β1,LS, and ˆ β1,IV . For expository purposes, we consider
a 10 cent tax increase because it yields eﬀects that are easily scalable and large enough to be of
economic interest, yet within the range of changes for which there is some historical precedent. We
evaluate the eﬀect at the volume-weighted mean after-tax price of $3.21 in March 2008.
Table 6 reports the eﬀect on gasoline consumption implied by our elasticity estimates. The
OLS estimates from Table 1 imply that a 10 cent tax increase is associated with less than a 1%
decrease in consumption. The IV estimate from column (4) of Table 4 implies much larger eﬀects,
with a 1.4% decrease in gasoline consumption. It is worth highlighting that during the second half
of 2008, gasoline prices decreased dramatically, reaching $1.75 in December 2008. If instead the
eﬀects are evaluated at this lower base level, the eﬀect of a 10 cent tax increase is approximately
twice as large.
In calculating the eﬀects in Table 6, we are assuming implicitly that the incidence of the tax is
entirely on buyers. This is consistent with the state panel estimates in Table 3 that imply a near
one-to-one relationship between tax increases and price increases. However, even if the supply of
gasoline for individual states is perfectly elastic, one might be concerned that the supply curve for
the entire United States is not. Indeed, although the national aggregate estimate in Table 3 does
not rule out a one-to-one relationship between tax increases and price increases at conventional
signiﬁcance levels, the point estimate implies less than full shifting. To the extent that supply is
less than fully elastic, part of the tax would be borne by the sellers. This would tend to lower the
reduction in gasoline consumption associated with such a tax.
134 Vector Autoregressive Models
4.1 Price Speciﬁcation
It is widely recognized that gasoline prices are endogenous with respect to macroeconomic
aggregates that drive the consumption of gasoline (see, e.g., Kilian 2008a). An alternative to using
instruments in identifying exogenous movements in gasoline prices is to focus on unpredictable
changes (or innovations) in gasoline prices. To the extent that these innovations are predetermined
with respect to the economic aggregates that drive gasoline consumption, the response of gasoline
consumption to such an innovation can be estimated. This alternative approach is particularly
appealing when working with monthly data, as we do in this paper, but less suitable for data
measured at lower frequency.
Let ∆pt denote the percent change in inﬂation-adjusted after-tax prices of gasoline and ∆yt the
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where ε1t and ε2t are mutually uncorrelated structural errors. All deterministic terms and
the dependence of both variables on lagged observations have been suppressed. Predeterminedness
in this model means that θ = 0 (see Cooley and LeRoy 1985). In other words, we rule out
contemporaneous feedback from ∆yt to ∆pt . In conjunction with the assumption that there are
no other exogenous innovations outside of the model that are correlated with the innovation in the
real price of gasoline, the coeﬃcient δ may be interpreted as the contemporaneous causal eﬀect of
the price innovation on real gasoline consumption.
The same logic applies in the more general VAR(p) model that allows for additional unrestricted
delayed feedback between real gasoline consumption growth and real gasoline price changes up








. Then the structural





In the benchmark model, we set the lag order p to 12. We also report alternative VAR results using
estimated lag orders obtained by formal model selection using tools such as the Akaike Information
14Criterion (AIC), as suggested by Ivanov and Kilian (2005). Predeterminedness in this VAR model
implies an exclusion restriction on the upper right element of A0. The reduced form representation





where Bi = A−1
0 Ai, i = 1,...,p, and et = A−1
0 εt. The reduced form may be estimated by the least
squares method. Applying a lower triangular Cholesky decomposition to the estimate of the 2 × 2
variance-covariance matrix Σet = A−1
0 A−1′
0 of the reduced form VAR errors allows us to estimate
A−1
0 subject to the identifying restriction of predetermined changes in gasoline prices. Given an
estimate of A−1
0 , it is straightforward to construct the dynamic responses of gasoline consumption
to an exogenous change in the price of gasoline from this model.18
How reasonable the exactly identifying assumption of predetermined changes in gasoline prices
is, by construction, cannot be tested within the context of this VAR model. Rather the credibility
of this assumption rests on an economic argument. Following Kilian (2009), we postulate that gas
distributors charge a ﬁxed markup on the wholesale price of gasoline. We postulate that the price
of gasoline reﬂects without delay gasoline supply shocks arising at the reﬁning stage and changes
in the price of imported crude oil representing costs shocks for U.S. reﬁners. The model stipulates
that the retail supply curve for gasoline is perfectly elastic in the short run. The presumption
is that gas distributors have enough gasoline to supply the required quantities of gasoline at the
current retail price in response to an unexpected increase in demand. Given that the consumption
of gasoline typically evolves smoothly and predictably, we abstract from the possibility that gas
distributors may run out of gas at the posted price. While unanticipated shifts in gasoline demand
in the model do not move the price of gasoline instantaneously, they are allowed to aﬀect the
price of gasoline with a delay of one month. The rationale for this assumption is the diﬃculty of
distinguishing a temporary blip in gasoline demand from a change in trend. Only if a change in
demand is sustained and hence is expected to persist, will a gas distributor respond by raising the
price of gasoline. Recognizing such persistent shifts in expected demand by construction requires
18Essentially the same identiﬁcation strategy has been used, for example, by Edelstein and Kilian (2007) and
Hamilton (2009). Both papers focused on a broader measure of retail energy prices. Similar identifying assumptions
are used routinely in the literature on estimating the dynamic responses to oil price shocks (see, e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford 1996; Blanchard and Gal´ ı 2007).
15time, justifying the delayed price response. Under these assumptions, the model can be used to
estimate the dynamic response of U.S. gasoline consumption to a 1% gasoline price increase, as
discussed above.
It may seem that the VAR model should include in addition any number of macroeconomic ag-
gregates since shifts in U.S. gasoline consumption are driven in part by U.S. macroeconomic events.
The inclusion of such additional variables is not required for the identiﬁcation of the gasoline price
shock, however, as long as changes in gasoline prices are predetermined with respect to all omitted
variables. To the extent that U.S. gasoline prices are predetermined with respect to these macroe-
conomic aggregates, there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to a bivariate model
in prices and quantities, since we can view the bivariate model as a marginalized representation
in which all additional variables other than the percent change in gasoline consumption have been
integrated out. Kilian and Vega (2008), on the basis of daily data, have recently shown that there
is no evidence of feedback from exogenous U.S. macroeconomic news to the U.S. retail price of
gasoline (or for that matter the price of crude oil) within one month of such shocks, suggesting that
the assumption that U.S. gasoline prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic
aggregates is a good approximation.
Our VAR analysis focuses on aggregate data at the national level.19 All models include seasonal
dummies. First, consider the bivariate VAR(12) model. The upper panel of Figure 6 shows the time
path of the response of U.S. gasoline consumption to a 1% increase in volume-weighted gasoline
prices. The impulse response coeﬃcients have been normalized such that the coeﬃcient estimates
can be interpreted as elasticities. One-standard error bands have been computed based on the
recursive-design wild bootstrap that allows for conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form (see
Goncalves and Kilian 2004). The use of a lower signiﬁcance level makes sense in the context
of unrestricted VAR models since these models involve many more parameters than the models
underlying Tables 1 and 2. The elasticity estimate implied by the VAR is small and statistically
insigniﬁcant on impact, but at longer horizons the price elasticity reaches near -0.12. This one-year
price elasticity is similar in magnitude to the least-squares estimate of the impact elasticity in
column (1) of Table 1, but that comparison is misleading since the VAR impact elasticity estimate
of -0.02 is much smaller than the estimate of -0.10 reported in Table 1.
An important question is to what extent our estimates would change if the assumption of a ﬂat
19We have also examined elasticities separately by state. Average elasticities, weighted by volume, are very similar
to the aggregate results.
16short-run gasoline supply curve were not literally correct. To address this issue we experimented
with VAR models that impose a weak degree of feedback from demand shifts to the price of gasoline.
In practice, we impose a value for θ that is greater than zero and solve numerically for the remaining
unrestricted parameter of A0 conditional on that identifying assumption (for a similar approach
see Abraham and Haltiwanger 1995). We investigated θǫ{0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5} . The choice of θ
has implications for the supply curve. If θ is equal to zero, as assumed in our baseline model, the
supply curve is ﬂat. For θ > 0 the supply curve is upward sloping. Relative to the benchmark of
no feedback, the one-year price elasticity is remarkably robust to these alternative assumptions.
Table 8 shows that the estimates at the 12-month horizon increases in absolute terms only slightly
from -0.12 for θ = 0 to -0.14 for θ = 0.5 . Thus, the additional evidence in Table 8 strengthens the
case for our original identifying assumption. There is a more marked increase in absolute terms in
the impact price elasticity from -0.02 to -0.09, as θ is increased, but that point is inconsequential
for the policy question of interest in this paper. We conclude that the one-year price elasticity
estimates are robust to alternative identifying assumptions.
4.2 Tax Speciﬁcation
Although these initial VAR estimates provide a crude estimate of the response of U.S. gasoline
consumption to a tax increase, they ignore the fact that tax increases may cause more persistent
price changes than other shocks. We would expect a larger consumption response to a gasoline
tax increase than to a gasoline price increase driven, for example, by a reﬁnery outage (see Kilian
2009). A more direct estimate of the tax elasticity may be obtained by replacing ∆pt in the




. As before, we focus on unit
taxes and exclude ad valorem taxes, and all taxes have been deﬂated using the U.S. consumer price
index. The model treats tax changes as predetermined with respect to changes in gasoline con-
sumption. Since innovations in gasoline taxes arise from a slow legislative process, the identifying
assumption of no contemporaneous feedback from U.S. gasoline consumption (or macroeconomic
aggregates correlated with U.S. gasoline consumption) to innovations in gasoline taxes is uncon-
troversial, providing a particularly clean identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀects, provided consumers do
not anticipate the tax increase. Of course, to the extent that consumers exhibit forward-looking
behavior, one may question the appropriateness of a vector autoregressive model for identifying
the causal eﬀects in general. In our case, it is not clear in what sense forward-looking behavior
would have contaminated the identiﬁcation. Households have few margins of adjustment through
17which they can respond to anticipated gasoline tax increases beyond ﬁlling up their gas tank one
last time prior to the tax change. While it is conceivable that a household might choose to buy a
more fuel-eﬃcient car in anticipation of a pending gasoline tax increase, it seems unlikely that this
type of behavior would have been quantitatively important in our data. The lower panel of Figure
6 shows the time path of the response of U.S. gasoline consumption to a one percent tax increase.
The tax elasticity is much larger on impact than the corresponding price elasticity in the upper
panel and statistically signiﬁcant. While the dynamic response is more erratic and the error bands
are wider, the one-year tax elasticity is about -0.13 and is statistically signiﬁcant.
A natural conjecture is that the elasticity estimates may be further improved upon by letting
the data help us in the selection of the lag order. We follow Ivanov and Kilian (2005) in selecting
the VAR lag order based on the AIC that trades oﬀ the improvement in the ﬁt of the model against
the proﬂigacy of parameters. Allowing for up to 12 lags, the AIC selects 9 lags for the model of the
price elasticity and 11 lags for the model of the tax elasticity. The implied price and tax elasticity
on impact are essentially unchanged relative to the model with a ﬁxed number of 12 lags, but the
one-year price elasticity falls to -0.07, whereas the one-year tax elasticity rises to -0.15, suggesting
a greater responsiveness to tax changes than to average price changes (see Table 7). Regarding the
sensitivity of the estimates to the degree of contemporaneous feedback from gasoline consumption
to the price of gasoline for this ﬁnal speciﬁcation, the results are qualitatively the same as in the
case of the VAR model with a ﬁxed number of 12 lags. Increasing θ to 0.5 increases the one-year
price elasticity to -0.09 , which still falls short of the direct estimate of the one-year tax elasticity.
4.3 Policy Implications
As in the case of the single-equation models, it is important to translate these elasticity estimates
into the eﬀect of a gasoline tax increase of τ cents on gasoline consumption. In calculating these
eﬀects it is critical to distinguish between price elasticities and tax elasticities. For example, given







whereas the 12-month tax elasticity of -0.13 implies a much larger eﬀect because it is relative to






18As before, we evaluate these eﬀects for a 10 cent tax increase at the volume-weighted mean after-tax
price of $3.21 in March 2008. For the base tax level we use 38.4 cents, the mean volume-weighted
tax level in March 2008.
Table 9 reports the eﬀect of a 10 cent gasoline tax increase on gasoline consumption implied
by the VAR estimates. The estimates based on the model with ∆pt yield less than a 1% decrease
in consumption. These implied changes in gasoline consumption are similar in magnitude to the
changes implied by the OLS estimates described in Table 6. The estimates from the model with
∆taxt yield considerably larger eﬀects. The AIC model, for example, implies that a 10 cent tax
increase would decrease gasoline consumption by 3.9%. When these eﬀects are evaluated at the
lower price levels in place in late 2008, the eﬀects based on tax elasticities are unchanged but the
results based on price elasticities are approximately twice as large.
There are two clear patterns in the estimates presented in Tables 6 and 9. First, estimates
based on methods that attempt to control for endogeneity, namely the state panel IV estimates
and the VAR estimates, are distinctly larger than other estimates. Second, the tax VAR estimates
are much larger than the preferred IV estimate based on using tax changes as instruments. The
apparent reason is that the VAR analysis does not restrict the sample to months in which discrete
changes in nominal gasoline taxes occurred. In fact, the tax VAR estimates are very similar to the
IV estimate implied by column (2) of Table 2 based on the unrestricted sample. In the latter case
we would have obtained a reduction in gasoline consumption of -3.91 compared with a reduction
of between -3.39 and -3.91 (depending on the lag speciﬁcation) for the tax VAR. These results
underscore the importance of restricting attention to dates of nominal tax increases in evaluating
policy proposals for gasoline tax increases. Although the VAR approach provides an alternative
to identifying the eﬀects of tax changes, it is not clear how to incorporate such nonlinearities into
the VAR framework (see, e.g., Kilian and Vigfusson 2009). This suggests caution in interpreting
the tax VAR estimates. For the remainder of the paper we therefore focus on our preferred IV
elasticity estimate of -0.46. This estimate provides a plausible upper bound on the likely eﬀects of
a gasoline tax increase on gasoline consumption within a year.
5 The Eﬀect of a Gasoline Tax on Carbon Emissions
Estimating the eﬀect of raising gas taxes on gasoline consumption, while interesting for other
purposes, is only a ﬁrst step in computing the eﬀect of such a policy on carbon emissions. The
19percentage change in total carbon dioxide emissions in the U.S. is calculated by multiplying the
gasoline consumption eﬀect by 0.338, the fraction of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States
derived from the transportation sector:20
(−1.43%)0.338 = −0.48%.
Here -1.43% is the change in gasoline consumption from a 10 cent gasoline tax increase based on
the estimate from Table 6. A 10 cent gasoline tax reduces carbon emissions in the United States
by 0.48% (see row 2 of Table 10). Although not negligible, this is small when compared to, for
example, recent annual increases in carbon emissions. Sampling variation implies that the true
eﬀect could be much smaller. The eﬀect could also be much larger, though it is unlikely to exceed
a few percentage points. For example, one can rule out carbon emission decreases in excess of 1.0%
with 95% conﬁdence.
Carbon emissions are a global problem. In order to put these results into perspective, the
third and fourth rows of Table 10 report the implied change in OECD and world emissions. These
percentage changes are calculated by multiplying the percentage eﬀect in the United States (shown
in row 2) by 0.45 and 0.21, respectively, the fraction of OECD and world emissions represented by
the United States.21 A 10 cent gasoline tax in the United States reduces OECD and world emissions
by considerably less than 1%. This reﬂects the facts that vehicles in the United States represent a
small and decreasing fraction of total OECD and global carbon dioxide emissions. Carbon dioxide
emissions in the United States are growing less quickly than emissions in other countries, most
notably China, India and Brazil. By 2030, according to predictions from the U.S. Department of
Energy, the United States will represent only 16.1% of total world carbon dioxide emissions.22
It is worth reemphasizing that these estimates capture only the short-run response (up to
one year). In the short-run, drivers can adjust discretionary driving patterns, drive slower, for
example, or improve fuel eﬃciency by increasing tire pressure. The long-run price elasticity is
likely to be larger as agents may employ additional margins of adjustment. For example, one would
expect to see widespread substitution toward more fuel-eﬃcient vehicles, some of which may not
20U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Outlook 2008, DOE/EIA-0383, Table A18, “Carbon Dioxide Emissions by
Sector and Source, 2006 and 2030”.
21U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2008, DOE/EIA-
0484, Table A10. “World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2030”.
22U.S. Department of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2008, DOE/EIA-0484, Table A10. “World Carbon
Dioxide Emissions by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2030”. Between 2005 and 2030, total energy-related carbon
dioxide emissions are forecast to increase by 83% in non-OECD countries compared to only 14% in OECD countries.
20even be available when the tax is ﬁrst implemented. Because the vehicle stock turns over slowly,
the full impact of a tax change will not be realized for many years. Likewise households may
choose to relocate closer to their workplace in an eﬀort to cut down on commuting or they may
demand improved public transportation. Predicting such long-run eﬀects is beyond the scope of
any econometric model based on historical data. Energy experts such as Severin Borenstein have
conjectured that the long-run elasticity may be between -0.6 and -0.8.23
These results highlight three mechanisms by which the global reduction in carbon emissions
might be ampliﬁed. First, widespread international adoption of gasoline tax increases may have
considerably larger eﬀects. Our analysis is focused on the United States and diﬀerences in income
levels and other factors suggest that the responsiveness of gasoline consumption to changes in
gasoline taxes is likely to diﬀer across countries. Moreover, many European countries already
impose high gasoline taxes. Nonetheless, if one takes our elasticity estimate as representative for
the world, a global 10 cent gasoline tax increase would decrease global emissions by 0.48%. This
calculation, of course, abstracts from the general equilibrium eﬀects of such a concerted action.
Second, the eﬀectiveness of carbon taxes would be ampliﬁed by imposing a broad-based carbon
tax on all sources of carbon dioxide rather than just gasoline. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that emissions from transportation represent a substantial fraction of total emissions and
that there is no reason to expect demand in other sectors to be substantially more elastic. Consider,
for example, the electric power sector which is responsible for 40% of total carbon dioxide emissions.
Electricity demand is commonly believed to be relatively inelastic (see, e.g. Reiss and White, 2008).
Thus, a tax, for example, on emissions from U.S. coal power plants is likely to be less eﬀective than
a gasoline tax. Although there is scope for substitution toward low-carbon fuels within the power
sector, much of the existing generating capacity is built around coal and natural gas.
Third, one could induce larger emission decreases with larger gasoline tax increases. Indeed,
some of the policies currently being proposed would increase the gasoline tax by as much as $1.00
per gallon or more.24 Our results should be applied with extreme caution when extrapolating
to such larger tax changes. Our estimates are based on examining the responsiveness of gasoline
23Louis Uchitelle and Megan Thee “Americans Are Cautiously Open to Gas Tax Rise, Poll Shows,” New York
Times (February 28, 2006).
24Gregory N. Mankiw “Raise the Gas Tax,” Wall Street Journal (October 20, 2006) advocates increasing the gas
tax by $1 per gallon, phased in gradually by 10 cents per year over the next decade. Mankiw has formed the “Pigou
Club”, a group of, “economists and pundits with the good sense to have publicly advocated higher Pigouvian taxes,
such as gasoline taxes or carbon taxes”. Current members include Bill Nordhaus, Martin Feldstein, Gary Becker,
Alan Greenspan, and others. See also Daniel Gross “Raise the Gasoline Tax? Funny, It Doesn’t Sound Republican,”
New York Times (October 8, 2006) and Kenneth Rogoﬀ “What America Must Do: Step on the Gas,” Foreign Policy
(January/February 2008).
21consumption to a series of relatively small tax changes implemented during the period 1989-2008.
There is no historical precedent for tax increases of more than 10 cents and it is unclear how
well linear econometric models will fare when subject to variation so clearly beyond the available
support, nor would it be possible to estimate such non-linear eﬀects from historical data.
6 Concluding Remarks
Although interest in carbon taxes has quieted down recently as a result of the rapidly dete-
riorating global economic conditions, that situation is likely to be temporary. As the economy
recovers, it will be only a question of time before these issues reemerge. Combating climate change
is widely known to be one of the priorities of the Obama administration. The current respite
provides an opportunity to reﬂect impassionately on the merits of a gasoline tax increase, as the
leading example of how a carbon tax would be implemented in practice.
In this paper we provided for the ﬁrst time a careful analysis of what can be learned from
historical data about the likely eﬀect of higher gasoline taxes on U.S. gasoline consumption. Such
an analysis seems warranted before adopting any proposal regarding gasoline taxes. A natural
approach to this question is to study the eﬀects of historical variation in gasoline tax rates both
over time and across states. We explored a variety of alternative econometric methods designed to
account for the endogeneity of gasoline prices as well as the unique nature of the policy experiment
in question. Our most credible estimates imply larger eﬀects than suggested by previous estimates
based on less appropriate econometric methodologies.
Nevertheless, our estimates imply that a gasoline tax increase of the magnitude currently con-
templated by policymakers would have only a modest short-run impact on carbon emissions. For
example, a 10 cent increase in gasoline taxes would lower U.S. emissions by about half of one per-
cent after one year. Another way of putting these results in perspective is to observe that this is
roughly equal to one-half of the typical annual increase in U.S. carbon emissions.
While our analysis makes full use of the available data, there are two obvious caveats. First,
it is conceivable that at longer horizons a gasoline tax would reduce carbon emissions by more.
For example, the introduction of more energy eﬃcient vehicles, some of which would not even be
available at the time when the policy is enacted, could amplify the long-run eﬀect of a gasoline tax
increase. On the other hand, the extent to which the fuel eﬃciency of cars would be increased and
the extent to which the introduction of electric cars, for example, would reduce carbon emissions -
22after accounting for emissions from the generation of the additional electricity - is an open question.
Predicting such long-run eﬀects is beyond the scope of standard econometric models based on
historical data.
Second, one possible response to our estimates of likely carbon emission reductions would be
to raise the gasoline tax even further to generate larger eﬀects on carbon emissions. Indeed some
pundits have recommended raising gasoline taxes cumulatively by as much as one dollar per gallon.
Still, it has to be borne in mind that the resulting reduction in carbon emissions may not grow
proportionately. Once we consider gasoline tax increases far larger than any gasoline tax increase in
U.S. history, there is reason to doubt the accuracy of predictions generated from linear econometric
models; nor is it possible to estimate such nonlinear eﬀects from historical data.
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25Table 1
The Eﬀect of Gasoline Prices on Gasoline Consumption
Least Squares Estimates
National Aggregate State Panel
∆pt -0.10 -0.19
(standard error) (0.04) (0.04)
Month of the year indicators yes yes
Time ﬁxed eﬀects no yes
R2 0.71 0.50
Observations 230 11,730
Note: This table reports the price elasticity of gasoline consumption from the national aggregate
and state panel speciﬁcations. In both speciﬁcations the dependent variable is the change in log
monthly gasoline consumption. The sample includes monthly observations from January 1989 to
March 2008. The state panel includes observations from all states and District of Columbia. The
national speciﬁcation includes month of the year indicators and the state panel includes separate
indicators for all 230 months in the sample. In the state panel the standard error is clustered by
state.
26Table 2
The Eﬀect of Gasoline Prices on Gasoline Consumption
Instrumental Variables Estimates
National Aggregate State Panel
∆pt -2.38 -1.14
(standard error) (6.88) (0.25)
Month of the year indicators yes yes
Time ﬁxed eﬀects no yes
Instrument F-statistic 0.11 242.6
(p-value) (0.74) (0.00)
Observations 230 11,730
Note: This table reports the price elasticity of gasoline consumption from the national aggre-
gate and state panel instrumental variables speciﬁcations. In both speciﬁcations the dependent
variable is the change in log monthly gasoline consumption. The measure of gasoline taxes that
we use as an instrument excludes ad valorem taxes. The sample includes monthly observations
from January 1989 to March 2008. The state panel includes observations from all states and
District of Columbia. The national speciﬁcation includes month of the year indicators and the
state panel includes separate indicators for all 230 months in the sample. In the state panel the
standard error and instrument F-statistic are clustered by state.
27Table 3
Least Squares Estimates of The Eﬀect of Gasoline Taxes
on Gasoline Prices and Gasoline Consumption
National Aggregate State Panel
Dependent Variable: Changes in Gasoline Prices (∆pt)
∆taxt 0.07 0.28
(standard error) (0.20) (0.02)
F-statistic ∆taxt 0.11 242.6
(p-value) (0.74) (0.00)
R2 .19 .81
Dependent Variable: Changes in Gasoline Consumption (∆yt)
∆taxt -0.16 -0.32
(standard error) (0.11) (0.07)
F-statistic ∆taxt 2.13 19.26
(p-value) (0.15) (0.00)
R2 .70 .47
Note: This table reports least squares estimates of the eﬀect of changes in gasoline
taxes on changes in gasoline prices and changes in gasoline consumption. Both na-
tional aggregate and state panel results are presented. Our measure of gasoline taxes
excludes ad valorem taxes. Because the IV estimator is exactly identiﬁed, the IV
estimates reported in Table 2 are a simple ratio of the estimates presented here. The
sample includes monthly observations from January 1989 to March 2008. The state
panel includes observations from all states and District of Columbia. The national
speciﬁcation includes month of the year indicators and the state panel includes sep-
arate indicators for all 230 months in the sample. In the state panel standard errors
and F-statistics are clustered by state.
28Table 4
The Eﬀect of Gasoline Prices on Gasoline Consumption
State Panel Instrumental Variables Estimates: Nominal Tax Changes Only
Nominal Increases and Decreases Nominal Increases Only
Greater Than Greater Than Greater Than Greater Than
All 1 Cent 2 Cents All 1 Cent 2 Cents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆pt -0.74 -.70 -.70 -0.46 -0.42 -0.28
(standard error) (0.38) (0.45) (0.40) (0.23) (0.23) (0.38)
Instrument F-statistic 73.5 68.3 58.3 30.6 27.7 12.8
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 268 162 100 210 140 86
Note: This table reports the price elasticity of gasoline consumption from six alternative state panel instrumental variables speciﬁcations. In all speciﬁca-
tions the dependent variable is the change in log monthly gasoline consumption. The measure of gasoline taxes that we use as an instrument excludes ad
valorem taxes. Since there are few overlapping tax increases it is not practical to use time ﬁxed eﬀects in these speciﬁcations. Column (1) includes state
by month observations during the period January 1989 to March 2008 in which there was a strict change in nominal state gasoline taxes. The speciﬁcation
in column (4) restricts the sample to include only strict increases. The speciﬁcations in columns (2) and (3) restrict the sample to include only nominal
changes of at least 1 and 2 cents, respectively. The speciﬁcations in columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to include only nominal increases of at least
1 and 2 cents, respectively. Standard errors and instrument F-statistics are clustered by state.
2
9Table 5
The Eﬀect of Gasoline Prices on Gasoline Consumption, Alternative Speciﬁcations
State Panel Instrumental Variables Estimates: Nominal Increases Only
Baseline Median IV Including Including All
Estimate Regression Unemployment Population State-Level
Rate Density Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆pt -0.46 -0.47 -0.49 -0.43 -0.45
(standard error) (0.23) (0.41) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Note: This table reports the price elasticity of gasoline consumption from the state panel instrumental variables speciﬁcation
with nominal increases only and four alternative speciﬁcations. In all speciﬁcations the dependent variable is the change
in log monthly gasoline consumption. The measure of gasoline taxes that we use as an instrument excludes ad valorem
taxes. The sample includes monthly observations from January 1989 to March 2008. The baseline speciﬁcation in column
(1) is identical to the speciﬁcation in column (4) of Table 4. The speciﬁcation in column (2) reports results from median IV
regression. The speciﬁcation in column (3) includes changes in state-level unemployment rates. The speciﬁcation in column
(4) includes the percent change in state population density. Finally, the speciﬁcation in column (5) allows for both changes
in the unemployment rate and the population density. Standard errors in columns (1) and (3)-(5) are clustered by state.
Standard errors in column (2) are block bootstrap by state with 100 replications.
30Table 6
The Eﬀect of a 10 Cent Gasoline Tax Increase on Gasoline Consumption
Traditional Regression Estimates
(in percent)
OLS Estimate, National Aggregate -0.31
(standard error) (0.11)
OLS Estimate, State Panel -0.59
(standard error) (0.12)
IV Estimate, State Panel -1.43
(standard error) (0.72)
Note: The eﬀect of a 10 cent gasoline tax is evaluated at the volume-weighted mean after-tax price
of $3.21 in March 2008. The implied eﬀects for OLS are based on the -0.10 and -0.19 elasticities in
Table 1. The implied eﬀect for state panel IV is based on the -0.46 estimate in column (4) of Table
4.
31Table 7
Price and Tax Elasticities Estimated from Structural VAR Models
Horizon in Months
0 1 3 6 9 12
Price Elasticity (12 lags) -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12
Tax Elasticity (12 lags) -0.14 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.13
Price Elasticity (AIC) -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07
Tax Elasticity (AIC) -0.14 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.17 -0.15
Note: The sample period is 1989.1-2007.3 and the data frequency is monthly. Boldface indicates
statistical signiﬁcance based on one-standard error bands. All models include seasonal dummies.
The AIC lag orders were selected based on an upper bound of 12 lags. The AIC selects 9 lags for
the model of the price elasticity and 11 lags for the model of the tax elasticity.
32Table 8
Price Elasticities Estimated from Structural VAR(12) Models under Al-
ternative Assumptions about the Strength of Feedback from Gasoline
Consumption to the Price of Gasoline as Measured by θ
Horizon in Months
θ 0 1 3 6 9 12
0 -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12
0.1 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12
0.2 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13
0.3 -0.06 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13
0.4 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14
0.5 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14
Note: The sample period is 1989.1-2007.3 and the data frequency is monthly. Boldface indi-
cates statistical signiﬁcance based on one-standard error bands. All models include seasonal
dummies.
33Table 9
The Eﬀect of a 10 Cent Gasoline Tax Increase on Gasoline Consumption
At 12 Month Horizon According to the Structural VAR Estimates in Table 7
(in percent)
Based on Price Elasticity, VAR(12 lags) -0.37
(standard error) (0.07)
Based on Tax Elasticity, VAR(12 lags) -3.39
(standard error) (3.17)
Based on Price Elasticity, VAR(AIC) -0.22
(standard error) (0.13)
Based on Tax Elasticity, VAR(AIC) -3.91
(standard error) (2.91)
Note: The eﬀect of a 10 cent gasoline tax is evaluated at the volume-weighted mean after-tax
price of $3.21 and mean tax of 38.4 cents in March 2008.
34Table 10
The Eﬀect of a 10 Cent Gasoline Tax Increase on Carbon Emissions
(in percent)
Gasoline Consumption in the U.S. -1.43
(standard error) (0.72)
Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the U.S. -0.48
(standard error) (0.24)
Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the OECD -0.22
(standard error) (0.11)
Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions Worldwide -0.10
(standard error) (0.05)
Note: These results are based on the -0.46 price elasticity from column (4) of Table 4 and
the volume-weighted mean after-tax price of $3.21 in March 2008. We assume that 33.8%
of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States are derived from the transportation sector
following U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Outlook 2008, DOE/EIA-0383, Table A18,
“Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Sector and Source, 2006 and 2030”. Moreover, we assume
that the United States represents 44.7% of total OECD carbon dioxide emissions and 21.0%
of total world carbon dioxide emissions following predictions for 2010 from U.S. Department
of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2008, DOE/EIA-0484, Table A10. “World Carbon
Dioxide Emissions by Region, Reference Case, 1990-2030”.
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37Figure 3: Variation in Gasoline Tax 1989-2008, By State
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39Figure 6a: Response of U.S. Aggregate Gasoline Consumption to a Positive Gasoline Price Shock
with One-Standard Error Bands, VAR(12) Model










Figure 6b: Response of U.S. Aggregate Gasoline Consumption to a Positive Tax Shock with One-
Standard Error Bands, VAR(12) Model










40Figure 7a: Response of U.S. Aggregate Gasoline Consumption to a Positive Gasoline Price Shock
with One-Standard Error Bands, VAR Model Based on AIC Lag Order Estimate










Figure 7b: Response of U.S. Aggregate Gasoline Consumption to a Positive Tax Shock with One-
Standard Error Bands, VAR Model Based on AIC Lag Order Estimate
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